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THE CONSERVATIVE CHALLENGE TO CARING FOR 
COMPENSATED CAREGIVERS 
 





Growing numbers of households are turning to home care workers to 
help provide critical care for aging and disabled family members.    
However, the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Harris v. Quinn1 and more 
recent developments hold troubling implications for the provision of 
quality home care at a time when the demand for such care is at an all-time 
high.   
Harris involved an Illinois law that governed the rights of state-paid 
workers who provided home care services to disabled and elderly 
individuals to join a union and engage in collective bargaining.  In a 5-4 
decision, the Court held that the state could not require workers who opted 
not to join the union to pay fees to cover the costs of union activities on 
their behalf.   Harris, and the Court’s later decision in Janus v. AFCSME,2 
opened the door for a full-fledged attack against state-paid home care 
workers as part of a larger conservative campaign to gut public sector 
unions.3  The most recent manifestation of that onslaught occurred in 2019 
when the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) adopted a rule 
that bars these workers from deducting union dues from their paychecks.4  
 
* Charles Nagel Professor of Labor and Employment Law, Washington University in St. Louis.   
1. 573 U.S. 616 (2014). 
2. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
3. See, e.g., Juliana Feliciano Reyes, Anti-Union Groups Are Targeting Home-Care Workers 
Nationally, But Labor in Pa. Has Already Scored a Win, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 4, 2019), 
https://www.inquirer.com/news/home-care-workers-union-dues-pennsylvania-20190604.html 
[https://perma.cc/E5L6-33MJ] (commenting that “[c]orporate-backed groups that seek to weaken unions 
through legal challenges and public policy have set their sights on home-care workers”). 
4. See infra notes 47-77 and accompanying text; see also Shefali Luthra, Medicaid Officials Target 
Home Health Aides’ Union Dues, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 13, 2018), 
https://khn.org/news/medicaid-officials-target-home-health-aides-union-dues/ 
[https://perma.cc/LM7K-CHA4]. 
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As this essay discusses, these developments threaten to destabilize the 
unionization that has helped transform home care into a viable job for many 
workers and to undermine the quality of care that they provide to clients.    
This essay begins by briefly outlining some of the supply and demand 
concerns in the home care industry, and the crucial role that organized 
labor has played in addressing these issues.  Afterwards, it discusses the 
conservative attack on state-paid home care workers, examining Harris 
and the CMS rule change.  The essay closes by exploring the value of the 
proposed federal domestic workers bill of rights and recommending 
proactive measures that states should pursue to help fortify the home care 
industry.  
 
I. THE HOME CARE CRISIS AND THE POWER OF ORGANIZED LABOR 
 
Go online, turn on the television, or pick up a newspaper and you are 
likely to find a discussion that underscores society’s preoccupation with the 
growing number of Americans who need home care, especially aging baby 
boomers,5 and the shortage of available care workers.  This “care crisis” is 
detrimental to low-income and working-class families, as well as career-
oriented professionals.6  Access to adequate caregiving is vital not only 
because it helps families satisfy their household needs but also because it 
facilitates the participation of family members in economic and other 
activities outside the household. Yet, despite the dramatic demand for home 
care, the adverse job conditions that prevail in the industry make it difficult 
to attract and retain workers.7  As a group, home care workers are 
 
5. See, e.g., Alexia Campbell, Home Health Aides Care for the Elderly. Who Will Care for Them?, 
VOX (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/8/21/20694768/home-health-aides-
elder-care [https://perma.cc/J8YT-EU2Q] (noting that the number of adults over the age of eighty-five—
currently 6.3 million—“is expected to more than triple to 19 million by 2050”). 
6. See, e.g., id.; Kourtney Lipelt, Solving the Home Care Crisis at the State Level, HOME HEALTH 
CARE NEWS (Jan. 18, 2017), https://homehealthcarenews.com/2017/01/solving-the-home-care-crisis-at-
the-state-level/ [https://perma.cc/AV8C-QJD8]; Jay Newton Small, A Growing American Crisis: Who 
Will Care for the Baby Boomers?, TIME (Feb. 15, 2019), https://time.com/5529152/elderly-caregiving-
baby-boomers-unpaid-caregivers-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/2YQW-CT38]; Bob Woods, America’s $103 
Billion Home Health-care System is in Crisis as Worker Shortage Worsens, CNBC (Apr. 9, 2019), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/09/us-home-healthcare-system-is-in-crisis-as-worker-shortages-
worsen.html [https://perma.cc/RD83-532K]. 
7. See Campbell, supra note 5 (“Home care workers are among those who are hard to find. Not 
everyone is willing to deal with difficult patients for low pay and no benefits when so many other jobs 
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disproportionately poor women of color who are often immigrants, and who 
rarely receive job-related benefits such as health insurance, sick leave, 
vacation time, or retirement plans.8  They are also routinely subject to 
discrimination,9 required to work excessively long hours,10 and exposed to 
workplace health and safety hazards.11  In addition, these workers are 
especially vulnerable to exploitative working conditions because various 
labor and employment laws deny them protections routinely extended to 
other workers.    
This state of affairs poses serious consequences for workers as well 
as for clients and families who depend on their services.  Low wages, few 
benefits, and demanding job conditions greatly exacerbate the shortage of 
workers and jeopardize the quality of care provided to elderly and disabled 
 
8.  See generally SARAH LEBERSTEIN, IRENE TUNG & CAITLIN CONNOLLY, NAT’L EMP’T LAW 
PROJECT, UPHOLDING LABOR STANDARDS IN HOME CARE 4 (Dec. 2015), https://www.nelp.org/wp-
content/uploads/Report-Upholding-Labor-Standards-Home-Care-Employer-Accountability.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XCG7-XBP4].  
9.  Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Alameda In-Home Senior Care Provider 
Settles EEOC Harassment Case (Nov. 11, 2018),  https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/11-19-
18.cfm [https://perma.cc/S835-Y3TH] (referencing the comment of an EEOC official that “‘[i]n-home 
caregivers can be particularly vulnerable to  harassment, and one of the EEOC’s top priorities is to 
defend vulnerable workers against discrimination’”); see also Sarah Jaffe, Who’s Protecting Home-Care 
Workers in the #MeToo Era?, DAME (April 3, 2018),  
https://www.damemagazine.com/2018/04/03/whos-protecting-home-care-workers-in-the-metoo-era/ 
[https://perma.cc/XV9A-DDQB] (discussing the problem of sexual harassment among home care and 
other domestic workers). 
10.  See, e.g., Paula Katinas, Home Care Attendants Demand Shorter Work Hours, BROOKLYN 
REPORTER (Sept. 10, 2019), https://brooklynreporter.com/2019/09/home-care-attendants-demand-
shorter-work-hours [https://perma.cc/M3GC-2JB8] (highlighting the problem of long hours among 
home care workers); PAUL K. SONN, CATHERINE K. RUCKELSHAUS & SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NAT’L 
EMP’T LAW PROJECT, FAIR PAY FOR HOME CARE WORKERS 19 (August 2011) (discussing the problem 
of long hours in home care and how such hours can compromise the quality of care), 
https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/FairPayforHomeCareWorkers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JB32-H4MF]. 
11.  See TRACI GALINSKY ET AL., NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, 
OCCUPATIONAL HAZARDS IN HOME HEALTHCARE (2010) (reporting on concerns of health and safety 
for home care workers), https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2010-125/pdfs/2010-125.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WB7J-KL9R]; Russell Suarez et al., Frequency and Risk of Occupational Health and 
Safety Hazards for Home Healthcare Workers, 29 HOME HEALTHCARE MGMT. & PRAC. 207, 207 (2017) 
(commenting that home care workers face multiple hazards with injury rates being more than double the 
national average); see also Peggie R. Smith, Aging and Caring in the Home: Regulating Paid 
Domesticity in the Twenty-First Century, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1837, 1871-1900 (2007) [hereinafter Smith, 
Aging and Caring] (discussing application of the Occupational Safety and Health Act for the health and 
safety of home care workers). 
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persons.12   Consider that in 2017 the median caregiver turnover rate across 
the industry was 66.7 percent.13   For clients, the costs associated with this 
statistic can be devastating.  When workers quit, often unexpectedly, 
clients must adjust to new workers and may experience disruptions to their 
care that can lead to hospitalization.  For other clients, turnover can 
culminate in their relocation to an institutional setting such as a nursing 
home.14   
Against this backdrop, organized labor has made impressive gains in 
some parts of the country through the unionization of state-paid home care 
workers (often referred to as “personal care aides” or “personal 
assistants”).15  Beginning in the 1990s, unions joined forces with these 
workers, disability activists, and consumer advocacy groups to push states 
to adopt measures that would give workers the right to unionize.  Today, 
at least nine states allow these workers to unionize, including California, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Oregon, 
Vermont, and Washington.16  The organization of state-paid home care 
workers has netted the labor movement its most significant membership 
 
12.  See PHI, STATE OF CARE: MINNESOTA’S HOME CARE LANDSCAPE 14 (2017), 
https://phinational.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/phi_minnesota_report_web3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4KAB-4Z8R] (observing that “[t]he quality of home care jobs has a significant impact 
on turnover rates and quality of care”). 
13.  Amy Baxter, Median Home Care Turnover Hit 66.7% in 2017, HOME HEALTH CARE NEWS (Apr. 
19, 2018), https://homehealthcarenews.com/2018/04/median-home-care-turnover-hit-66-7-in-2017/ 
[https://perma.cc/PE6K-YZ5W].  
14.  See, e.g., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT,  SURVEYING THE HOME CARE WORKFORCE: THEIR 
CHALLENGES & THE POSITIVE IMPACT OF UNIONIZATION 7 (2017), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-
content/uploads/surveying-home-care-workforce.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HJH-HZAW] (noting that 
“[t]urnover can impact the quality and continuity of care that a consumer receives”); DORIE SEAVEY, 
THE COST OF FRONTLINE TURNOVER IN LONG-TERM CARE (2004), 
https://www.leadingage.org/sites/default/files/Cost_Frontline_Turnover.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7DS-
D823] (examining the causes and consequences of turnover among long-term care workers including 
home care workers). 
15.  I use the phrase “state-paid home care workers” to refer to independent workers who are providing 
publicly-funded care, most often under a consumer-directed Medicaid program. The workers are 
independent in that they are not employed by a third-party home care agency.  Instead, they are 
considered employees of care recipients as consumers. See infra notes 26 and 27, and accompanying 
text.  Less clear is whether and under what circumstances they may qualify as public employees. See 
infra notes 37, 67, and 68, and accompanying text. 
16.  Brief for Respondent at 51 n.14, Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (No. 11-681); see also 
Peggie R. Smith, The Publicization of Home-based Care Work in State Labor Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 
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gains since 1937.17  As commentators have observed, the organization of 
these workers represents the new face of labor.18 
Unions have used these gains to improve working conditions in the 
industry and in turn the quality of care provided.   In Illinois, for example, 
where the state’s home care workers elected the Service Employees 
International Union (SEIU) as their union representative, collective 
bargaining has yielded training and orientation programs as well as 
increased compensation and health benefits for workers.  It has also 
prompted the creation of a registry to help match clients with workers, and 
established a committee of workers and consumers to tackle issues of 
mutual concern.19   Similar advancements have occurred in other states 
where unions are representing the interests of state-paid home care 
workers.20 The unionization of these workers has also curbed state 
spending on long-term care.  In Illinois, evidence indicates that the state 
has saved in excess of $600 million per year in Medicaid costs as a result 
of transitioning expenditures away from nursing home care to in-home 
care.21  
It is unlikely that these achievements would have occurred without 
the labor movement promoting the collective interests of workers through 
organizing.   In states that do not allow these workers to unionize, they 
 
17.  Steven Greenhouse, In Biggest Drive Since 1937, Unions Gain a Victory, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 
1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/26/us/in-biggest-drive-since-1937-union-gains-a-
victory.html [https://perma.cc/G253-J6Y3] (reporting that SEIU’s organization of 74,000 home care 
workers in California in 1999 was the “biggest unionization drive in more than half a century”). 
18.  See, e.g., id.; see also Frank Swoboda, A Healthy Sign for Organized Labor, WASH. POST (Feb. 
27, 1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1999/02/27/a-healthy-sign-for-
organized-labor/176f3a3c-4aa6-4b0c-aaed-6b9bd8186af0/ [https://perma.cc/5GAD-ZUSE]. 
19.  See Brief for Respondent SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana at 6-7, Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 
(2014) (No. 11-681). 
20.  See generally Ross Eisenbrey, Harris v. Quinn is About the Right of Home Care Workers to Improve 
Their Wages, ECON. POL’Y INST.: WORKING ECON. BLOG (May 20, 2014), 
https://www.epi.org/blog/harris-quinn-home-care-workers-improve-wages/ [https://perma.cc/3PEP-
222C] (discussing impact of unionization in various states on working conditions in home care and 
improvements in the quality of care); Smith, Publicization, supra note 16, at 1413 (discussing impact of 
unionization in various states on working conditions in home care); see also Don McIntosh, Homecare 
Workers Get Retirement, Harassment Policy in New Contract, NWLABORPRESS (Sept. 18, 2019), 
https://nwlaborpress.org/2019/09/homecare-workers-get-retirement-harassment-policy-in-new-
contract/ [https://perma.cc/HML9-K4LA] (reporting on SEIU’s new collective bargaining agreement 
with Oregon that provides covered home care workers with pay raises, access to a retirement savings 
plan, and protections against on-the-job sexual harassment). 
21.  NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, GIVING CAREGIVERS A RAISE 3 (2015), https://www.nelp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Giving-Caregivers-A-Raise.pdf [https://perma.cc/MT76-QU94]. 
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remain largely invisible and ignored, toiling in the private setting of 
individual homes in isolation from each other, and lacking the ability to 
make the type of systemic changes necessary to improve their working 
conditions or the quality of care they deliver.   Labor’s success owes to its 
commitment to collective action and, just as importantly, its willingness to 
leave behind outdated forms of traditional organizing in favor of new 
strategies that mirror the reality of changing workplace relationships and 
shifting economic landscapes.  In short, labor figured out how to organize 
these workers, even as popular sentiment deemed them unorganizable,22 
and transformed home care into a decent job with good benefits for many 
workers.  
 
II. THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON STATE-PAID  
HOME CARE WORKERS 
 
Unfortunately, the phenomenal success of the labor movement with 
respect to state-paid home care workers has coincided with sustained 
conservative efforts to weaken the union movement, especially the 
unionization of public-sector employees.23  As one commentator observed, 
“conservatives view unions that represent public sector employees . . . as 
anathema.”24  While conservative groups have sought to undermine public-
sector unionization across the board, the attacks against state-paid home 
care workers have been especially virulent.  The conservative bullseye on 
home care no doubt stems in part from unions’ success in representing 
these workers, and their potential to represent considerably more workers 
 
22.  See Peggie R. Smith, Organizing the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household Workers and 
Approaches to Employee Representation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 45 (2000).  The traditional view of domestic 
workers as unorganizable has not been limited to the United States.  See, e.g., Zhe Jiang & Marek 
Korczynski, When the “Unorganizable” Organize: The Collective Mobilization of Migrant Domestic 
Workers in London, 69 HUM. REL. 813 (2016) (discussing domestic workers in the United Kingdom). 
23.  See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Public Unions Under First Amendment Fire, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1291 (2018); Michael L. Artz, Beyond Wisconsin: Public Employee Union Rights Amidst State Attacks 
on Public Sector Collective Bargaining, 2 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 131 (2012); Kenneth Glenn Dau-
Schmidt & Winston Lin, The Great Recession, the Resulting Budget Shortfalls, the 2010 Elections and 
the Attack on Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the United States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 
407 (2012); Anne Marie Lofaso, In Defense of Public-Sector Unions, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP L.J. 301 
(2011).  
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over the coming years, given that home care jobs are among the fastest-
growing occupations in the United States.25  The longstanding legal 
marginalization of individuals who perform domestic work in the home 
has also aided and exacerbated the assault.  Even as home care workers 
provide an invaluable service to countless families, the law most often 
treats them as second-class citizens who are less deserving of the labor and 
employment protections that so many workers take for granted.   The 
Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Harris v. Quinn vividly captures this 
point. 
The home care workers at issue in Harris provided services to 
individuals who qualified for home care services under a publicly-funded 
consumer-directed care program.   This type of program, which exists in 
almost every state, focuses on individuals who, because of age and/or 
disability, need assistance to live in their own homes but cannot afford such 
assistance.26  Relying heavily on Medicaid funding, Illinois and other states 
compensate home care workers in order to aid consumers with personal 
care and household activities as well as occasional basic medical tasks. The 
programs are “consumer directed” because they empower individual care 
recipients, as consumers, to control and direct their own care.27  Consumers 
can decide, for example, whom to select as a worker; they can also 
supervise the work.  Although consumers make day-to-day choices 
concerning the services that they receive, state agencies that operate the 
programs can implement universal terms and conditions of employment—
such as training, compensation, and benefits—for all participating home 
care workers.  
Because Illinois considered these workers independent contractors, 
then governor Rod Blagojevich issued an executive order that designated 
them as “public employees” for purposes of exercising collective 
 
25.  Occupational Outlook Handbook: Home Health Aides and Personal Care Aides, U.S. BUREAU 
LAB. STAT. (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/home-health-aides-and-personal-care-
aides.htm [https://perma.cc/2XYE-A5JZ] (reporting that “employment of home health aides and 
personal care aides is projected to grow 36 percent from 2018 to 2028, much faster than the average for 
all occupations”). 
26.  Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 620-21 (2014). 
27.  See, e.g., A. E. Benjamin, Consumer-Directed Services at Home: A New Model for Persons with 
Disabilities, 20 HEALTH AFF. 80 (2001); A. E. Benjamin & Ruth E. Matthias, Age, Consumer Direction, 
and Outcomes of Supportive Services at Home, 41 GERONTOLOGIST 632 (2001). 
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bargaining rights under the state’s labor relations act.28  A majority of the 
workers eventually elected SEIU to represent their interests.   The Illinois 
labor law, similar to most labor laws, requires an elected union to represent 
all workers in a given bargaining unit, including workers who vote against 
unionization.29  Thus while some of the state-paid home care workers did 
not join the union, they were legally required to pay “agency fees”30 to 
cover their fair share of the union’s costs in providing them with legal 
services pursuant to agreements reached with the state including, for 
example, costs associated with the provision of workplace benefits and 
protections.31  
 In 2010, the conservative National Right to Work Foundation filed suit 
on behalf of eight workers who objected to paying SEIU agency fees.  In a 
5-4 decision, with an opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito for the 
conservative majority, the Supreme Court ruled that compulsory “agency 
fees” violated the workers’ First Amendment rights.32 In reaching this 
ruling, the Court concluded that its 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Board 
of Education33 was not controlling.  In Abood, the Court held that states can 
require public employees to contribute fair share fees to compensate unions 
for their representation activities even if the employees do not elect to join 
the union.34 The Harris Court reasoned that Abood did not apply to the 
Illinois home care workers in question because, in light of the consumer-
 
28.  Harris, 573 U.S. at 624-25 (the Illinois legislature eventually codified the executive order under 
the state’s public sector labor law). 
29.  See id. at 666–67 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing the duty of fair representation); see also Steele 
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202–03 (1944) (concluding in the context of the Railway 
Labor Act that a labor organization must act “without hostile discrimination” amongst members and 
must “represent all its members, the majority as well as the minority”); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 
U.S. 330, 337 (1953) (extending this duty to the National Labor Relations Act). 
30.  Harris, 573 U.S. at 638 (defining such fees as “a provision under which members of a bargaining 
unit who do not wish to join the union are nevertheless required to pay a fee to the union”). For an 
excellent account of the significance of the First Amendment to agency fees, see Benjamin Sachs, 
Agency Fees and the First Amendment, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1046 (2018). 
31.  Such fees eliminate the free-rider problem by ensuring that non-union members pay their fair share 
for the benefits and protections that the union negotiates on behalf of all workers. See Harris, 573 U.S. 
at 627 (“The primary purpose of permitting unions to collect fees from nonmembers . . . is to prevent 
nonmembers from free-riding on the union's efforts, sharing the employment benefits obtained by the 
union's collective bargaining without sharing the costs incurred.” (internal citations omitted)). 
32.  Harris, 573 U.S. at 656. 
33.  431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled by Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 
138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018). 
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driven nature of the state’s home care program, the workers were employed 
by care recipients and were not actually state employees.  As the Court 
reasoned, they were not “full-fledged public employees” but “quasi-public 
employees” or “partial-public employees.”35   The Court held that 
compelling such workers to pay agency fees violated their First 
Amendment rights because it requires them to pay a fee to a union that they 
do not wish to support.36 
In casting state-paid home care workers as a special sub-class of state 
workers, the Court minimizes the vital contributions of these workers to the 
economy and downplays the importance of the state in structuring and 
controlling the services that they perform on behalf of consumers.   As the 
dissent pointed out, although the Illinois home care program treats care 
recipients as the workers’ employers with respect to key aspects of their 
relationship, the state also serves as their employer.  The recipients and the 
state function as joint employers.37  By denying the employment 
relationship that exists between the state and the workers, the majority 
sidesteps the fact that the state, not care recipients, has the power to 
establish the most important terms of the workers’ employment including 
compensation and benefits. 
 The majority’s decision to treat state-paid home care workers as 
“quasi” state employees who are less deserving of labor protection than 
“full-fledged” state employees also taps into and reproduces the legal 
marginalization of individuals who perform domestic work in the home.38  
Because home care includes the performance of domestic activities inside 
 
35.  Harris, 573 U.S. at 646. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. at 660 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[E]ach caregiver has joint employers—the State and the 
customer—with each controlling significant aspects of the assistant’s work”). 
38.  For insightful commentary on Harris v. Quinn, see Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou, 
Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of Compelled Speech, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439 (2015). See 
also Sam Bagenstos, Harris v. Quinn Symposium: The Coming Conflict in Public Employee Speech Law 
and the Immediate Risks to People with Disabilities, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2014, 9:46 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/harris-v-quinn-symposium-the-coming-conflict-in-public-
employee-speech-law-and-the-immediate-risks-to-people-with-disabilities/ [https://perma.cc/DN2F-
L5KA]; Catherine Fisk, Harris v. Quinn Symposium: Court Departs from Federalism, First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, SCOTUSBLOG (July 3, 2014), https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/07/harris-v-
quinnsymposium-court-departs-from-federalism-first-amendment-jurisprudence/ 
[https://perma.cc/5QVU-NC3B];  Charlotte Garden, Harris v. Quinn Symposium: Decision Will Affect 
Workers & Limit States’ Ability to Effectively Manage Their Workforces, SCOTUSBLOG (July 2, 2014, 
1:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/07/harris-v-quinn-symposium-decision-will-affect-
workers-limit-states-ability-to-effectively-manage-their-workforces [https://perma.cc/UP38-HBXX]. 
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the homes of individual clients, the law regards it as a form of domestic 
work.   Historically labor and employment laws excluded this work from 
coverage.  This was true with respect to workplace laws enacted during the 
Progressive Era and as part of the New Deal.  Over time, some of these 
exclusions have gone by the wayside, although where coverage exists, laws 
commonly provide domestic workers with a reduction in coverage.  
Consider, for example, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).  As 
originally enacted, the law did not apply to domestic work and thus 
excluded home care workers.  A 1974 Amendment finally extended the 
Act’s overtime and minimum wage protections to employees “engaged in 
domestic service” but it purposefully left out the bulk of all home care 
workers.39   They were finally given FLSA protection in 2015 as a result of 
a regulatory reform.  Yet, an FLSA exemption still exists for live-in home 
care workers.40   Other legal exclusions, full or partial, include state 
workers’ compensation statutes, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 
the National Labor Relations Act, and state unemployment insurance 
statutes.   
 None of these exclusions were inevitable.  Each one represents a choice 
made by legislatures that in part reflected the value, or lack thereof, that 
they placed on the work of poor women, mainly brown and black, who 
increasingly hail from outside the United States.  At times, most notably 
during the Progressive Era, the decision in favor of exclusion hinged deeply 
on notions that devalued “women’s work” and dismissed it as a “labor of 
love.”41  At other times, those gendered notions interacted with racism as 
 
39.  See Smith, Aging and Caring, supra note 11 at 1860-61 (discussing the history of the FLSA’s 
domestic service exemption and the home care companionship services exemption). 
40.  See, e.g., Peggie R. Smith, Work Like Any Other, Work Like No Other: Establishing Decent Work 
for Domestic Workers, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 159, 182-84 (2011) [hereinafter Smith, Decent 
Work] (questioning the blanket exclusion of live-in domestic workers from the FLSA’s overtime 
provision relative to other residential workers who are not so excluded).  
41.  Women’s work in the home has often been discounted and devalued by referring to it as a labor of 
love.  As described by economist Nancy Folbre, during the nineteenth century, “‘[t]he moral elevation 
of the home was accompanied by the economic devaluation of the work performed there.’”  ANN 
CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 47 (2002); see also Mary Romero, Bursting the 
Foundational Myths of Reproductive Labor Under Capitalism: A Call for Brave New Families or Brave 
New Villages?, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 177, 191 (2000)  (commenting that “[s]ince the 
reproductive labor defined as ‘women's work’ is devalued in society, rarely do we openly recognize the 
existence of skill involved, particularly the emotional labor of caregiving which is so often perceived as 
a ‘labor of love’”).   Unfortunately, even when domestic work is performed for pay, it continues to be 
undervalued as a form of women’s work.  Much has been written about the devaluation of caring labor.  
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was the case during the New Deal when African American women, who 
crowded the domestic work field, were cast aside to please southern racists.  
Today, the interplay of gender, race, and the vulnerabilities attached to the 
immigrant status of many workers42 continues to leave countless workers 
to fend for themselves.  The Court in Harris had a historical blueprint from 
which it did not waiver.  
Although Harris dealt a blow to home care workers and the labor 
movement, commentators were quick to observe that the decision was not 
as sea-changing as many had expected.43   Even as the Harris majority 
made its displeasure with Abood clear,44 the Court did not overrule it.  
Instead, the Court limited its holding to “quasi-public” state-paid home care 
workers.  However, in 2018, in Janus v. AFSCME, the Court overturned 
Abood and held that the First Amendment protected all public employees 
who did not wish to pay agency fees. 45 
Emboldened by the decisions in Harris and Janus, conservative groups 
have continued to use state-paid home care workers as a punching bag in 
the ongoing effort to gut organized labor.  While many of these battles are 
unfolding at the state level,46 conservatives are also pursuing a new national 
 
Virtue: The Relative Pay of Care Work, 49 SOC. PROBS. 455 (2002); NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE 
HEART: ECONOMICS AND FAMILY VALUES (2001); and EVELYN NAKANO-GLENN, FORCED TO CARE: 
COERCION AND CAREGIVING IN AMERICA (2012).  
42.  See Leberstein et al., supra note 8. 
43.  See, e.g., Andy Kroll, Supreme Court Delivers a Hit—But Not a “Kill Shot”—to Public-Employee 
Unions, MOTHER JONES (June 30, 2014, 10:50 AM), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/05/supreme-court-harris-quinn-unions-right-to-work/ 
[https://perma.cc/6EZ9-RVVY]; Stephanie Simons, For Unions, not a Fatal Verdict, POLITICO (June 3, 
2014), https://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/supreme-court-harris-v-quinn-ruling-108428 
[https://perma.cc/24DU-EDEF]. 
44.  Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 617 (2014) (“The Abood Court’s analysis is questionable on several 
grounds”).  
45.  Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). For an 
examination of various proposals on how unions might move forward post-Janus, see Catherine L. Fisk 
& Martin H. Malin, After Janus, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1821 (2019). 
46.  In Minnesota, the same conservative groups that backed Janus threw their support behind an 
unsuccessful effort to invalidate a state labor law that appointed SEIU as the bargaining representative 
for publicly subsidized home care workers in the state. See Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 
2018); see also Jim Spencer, Home-care Providers Ask Supreme Court to Overturn Minnesota Labor 
Law, STAR TRIBUNE (Dec. 13, 2018), http://www.startribune.com/home-care-providers-ask-supreme-
court-to-overturn-minnesota-law/502714952/ [https://perma.cc/BNZ4-BVNQ] (discussing the 
involvement of the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation in the Bierman case).  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld a challenge to a gubernatorial executive order that allowed state-
paid home workers to elect a representative organization for the purpose of discussing home care policy 
issues, including working conditions, with the state’s Department of Human Services. See Markham v. 
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strategy to undermine home care unions by eliminating workers’ ability to 
deduct union dues from their paychecks.   
In July 2018, the Trump administration issued a Department of Health 
and Human Services rule that requires the CMS to prohibit home health 
workers, paid directly by Medicaid, from having their union dues 
automatically deducted from their paychecks.47   Known as the 
Reassignment of Medicaid Provider Claims, the final rule was issued in 
May 2019,48 and is expected to adversely affect “more than half a million 
workers in California alone, and several hundred thousand more in 10 other 
states.”49   
The Social Security Act requires states to make direct payment to 
providers, such as home care workers, who deliver services to Medicaid 
recipients. In particular, section 1902(a)(32) of the Act provides that no 
payment shall be made to anyone other than to the individual or institution 
providing care or service to a recipient unless certain exceptions are met. 50   
Congress included this provision to prevent fraudulent practices.51 In 2012, 
CMS implemented an exception that authorized states, in their role as the 
primary source of revenue for state-paid home care workers, to withhold 
 
Wolf, 190 A.3d 1175 (Pa. 2018);  see also Andrew Sheeler, California Union Contracts Targeted in 
New Lawsuit Challenging How Workers Quit Paying Dues, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 17, 2019), 
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article232729022.html (“Conservative 
groups are suing the union representing in-home caretakers, alleging that the union is violating workers’ 
First Amendment rights by restricting when members can leave the labor organization.”).   
Various of the post-Janus lawsuits involving home care workers seek reimbursement of union dues 
previously paid. See, e.g., Lawsuit Seeks Reimbursement for Home Care Worker Union Dues, SEATTLE 
TIMES (July 3, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/apxlawsuit-seeks-reimbursement-for-
home-care-worker-union-dues [https://perma.cc/QD63-ZY6c] (commenting on a lawsuit to force 
Washington State and a union to reimburse home care workers for union fees paid).  On the issue of 
whether unions are retroactively liable for dues previously paid, see generally William Baude & Eugene 
Volokh, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term: Comment: Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 171, 171–72 (2018) (arguing that unions are liable for the agency fees that union-
represented workers previously paid); Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, Exaggerating the Effects 
of Janus: A Reply to Professors Baude and Volokh, 132 HARV. L. REV. F.  42 (2018) (disagreeing with 
Boude and Volokh, and maintaining that unions are not retroactively liable).  
47.  Medicaid Program; Reassignment of Medicaid Provider Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 32252 (proposed 
July 12, 2018) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447): see also Luthra, supra note 4. 
48.  Medicaid Program: Reassignment of Medicaid Provider Claims, 84 Fed. Reg. 19718 (May 6, 2019) 
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447) [hereinafter Medicaid Program Reassignment]. 
49.  Rachel M. Cohen, GOP-Led Efforts to Crush Unions Have a New Target: Home Health Care 
Workers, INTERCEPT (May 16, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/05/16/lawsuit-home-
care-workers-union-dues/ [https://perma.cc/R4B5-ACRB].  
50.  Social Security Act § 1902(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(32) (2010). 
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and remit payments to third parties, on behalf of the workers, “for health 
and welfare benefit contributions, training costs, and other benefits 
customary for employees.”52  Those third-party payments included union 
dues.  As a result, in those states where home care workers belong to a 
union, the exception allowed a state to withhold membership fees from the 
workers’ paychecks and transfer the fees to the union.  
CMS offered a detailed account to explain why it was important to 
allow states to assign payments to third parties: 
[T]he ability of the State to ensure a stable and qualified 
workforce may be adversely affected by the inability to 
withhold funds and make payments on behalf of the 
individual practitioner for health and welfare benefit 
contributions, training costs, and other benefits customary 
for employees. Withholding funds for these purposes is 
an efficient and effective method for ensuring that the 
workforce has provision for basic needs and is adequately 
trained for their functions. Direct payment of funds to 
third parties on behalf of the practitioner may simplify 
program operations for the State and be viewed as 
advantageous by the practitioner. In addition, direct 
payment of funds to third parties on behalf of the 
practitioners may ensure that beneficiaries have greater 
access to such practitioners and higher quality services.53 
In short, CMS viewed the 2012 exception as beneficial to individual 
workers, the state, home care recipients, and the home care industry more 
generally.   
Some commentators have suggested that the new Trump administration 
rule, which reversed the exception, was necessary to reduce rising 
Medicaid costs.   Yet this justification lacks any merit. Limiting home care 
workers’ ability to have their union dues automatically deducted from their 
earnings will not lead to reduced Medicaid costs since states must still pay 
 
52.  Medicaid Program: State Plan Home and Community-Based Services, 5-Year Period for Waivers, 
Provider Payment Reassignment, and Setting Requirements for Community First Choice, 77 Fed. Reg. 
26362, 26364 (proposed May 3, 2012) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 430). 
53.  Id. at 26392. 
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the workers. Money that the states would have automatically deducted for 
union dues will now go directly to the workers in the form of wages.54   
To be sure, workers can, of their own accord, pay their dues directly to 
the union, but doing so will now require them to take an extra step by, for 
example, sending payments by check or setting up automatic monthly 
deductions from a bank or credit card account.55  How realistic is this 
expectation? One commentator offers an apt analogy to the federal 
government deciding not to automatically deduct federal income taxes from 
employee paychecks and leaving it to individual workers to pay the taxes 
that they owe.  Such a change would result in countless workers failing “to 
set aside enough money each year for Uncle Sam.”56 The same is true here, 
perhaps with even greater force. Most home care workers, even with the 
increased compensation afforded by union membership, still struggle 
financially to make ends meet, and as a result, many are unlikely to have a 
bank account or a credit card.57  Others may simply eschew paying union 
dues in favor of purchasing food, clothes, or other immediate necessities.   
Bottom line, under the new rule, workers are going to be less likely to 
pay dues and as a result, unions may see their economic and political power 
diminished.58  Critics of the new rule point out that this result is the real 
motive behind the rule change and its intended consequence.59  Indeed, 
representatives of the National Right to Work Foundation and the Freedom 
Foundation, two anti-union groups, have stated that their organizations 
lobbied the Trump administration to stop the third-party payments with the 
hopes of declawing organized labor.60 It is thus no coincidence that the new 
 
54.  Cohen, supra note 49. 
55.  See Luthra, supra note 4 (discussing possible implications of the rule change); Valerie VanBooven, 
CMS Deals Blow to Unions That Had Been Automatically Deducting Dues from Medicaid-Paid Home 
Healthcare Workers, HOME CARE DAILY (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.homecaredaily.com/2019/05/14/cms-deals-blow-to-unions-that-had-been-automatically-
deducting-dues-from-medicaid-paid-home-healthcare-workers/ [https://perma.cc/B89S-645Q] (same). 
56.  Editorial, Fight Back against Trump’s Attack on Unions and Home Health Care Workers, CHI. 
SUN TIMES (May 24, 2019), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2019/5/24/18634461/medicaid-union-dues-
home-health-care-workers-seiu-cms [https://perma.cc/B5FN-LHAE] [hereinafter SUN TIMES Editorial]. 
57.  Id.; see also Luthra, supra note 4. 
58.  See Luthra, supra note 4. 
59.  SUN TIMES Editorial, supra note 56. 
60.  Claire Withycombe, Oregon Public Employee Unions Threatened by Changes, MAIL TRIBUNE 
(May 21, 2019), https://mailtribune.com/news/top-stories/oregons-public-employee-unions-threatened-
by-changes [https://perma.cc/FV5Y-VF9G] (reporting on the efforts of right-to-work groups that 
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rule only affects the very group of home care workers who are most likely 
to belong to a union, those independent providers who receive Medicaid 
dollars to deliver services to recipients receiving publicly subsidized care.61  
The new rule is extremely insidious.  While targeted at union fees, it 
sweeps more broadly and may prevent workers from taking advantage of 
automatic payroll deductions for other benefits, including retirement 
contributions, health insurance, as well as vision and dental insurance.62  
These benefits are rare in the home care industry, and for those unionized 
workers who enjoy them, they represent hard fought gains which may now 
be in jeopardy. Consider, for example, the situation in Oregon, the first state 
in the country to allow independent, government-funded home care workers 
to participate in a state-sponsored Roth IRA retirement plan.63  Both 
workers and the State can contribute to the plan.   As a result of the original 
CMS exception, Oregon was able to take workers’ contributions from their 
paychecks after taxes, thereby permitting workers tax-free withdrawals 
during retirement.64  Under the new rule, these contributions would qualify 
as impermissible “diversion[s] to . . . third parties . . . .”65   
CMS rationalizes this shocking outcome by declaring that adversely 
affected home care workers “are not employees of the state” and that they 
“do not receive salaries or wages from the state.”66  In making this debatable 
assertion, it appears that CMS relied on the Court’s conclusion in Harris.  
But even if the Court correctly concluded that the workers in Illinois were 
not state employees, such a determination stems from a fact-driven inquiry 
 
61.  The new rule change would not impact those home care workers who provide services funded by 
Medicaid but who are employed by home care agencies rather than by individual consumers. See 
Complaint-In-Intervention at 25, California v. Azar, No. 3:19-cv-02552-VC (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2019) 
[hereinafter California v. Azar Complaint-In-Intervention].  
62.  Medicaid Program: Reassignment of Medicaid Provider Claims, 84 Fed. Reg. 19718, 19718 (May 
6, 2019) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447) (prohibiting states from making third-party payments from 
Medicaid on behalf of publicly subsidized workers “for benefits such as “health insurance, skills 
training, and other benefits customary for employees”); Withycombe, supra note 60(discussing the 
potential impact of the new rule on the ability of home care workers to participate in state retirement 
savings accounts).   
63.  OregonSaves Provides Homecare Workers with a Pathway to Retirement, SEIU503, 
https://seiu503.org/oregonsaves-provides-homecare-workers-with-a-pathway-to-retirement/ 
[https://perma.cc/RLA8-ZR2N] [hereinafter SEIU503]. 
64.  Damian Davilia, Retirement Plan Laws in Oregon: The Basics of OregonSaves 2019, HUM. 
INTEREST (Feb. 16, 2017), https://humaninterest.com/blog/retirement-plan-laws-oregon-basics-
oregonsaves-2017/ [https://perma.cc/TVE9-3HB3]; see also SEIU503, supra note 63. 
65.  Medicaid Program Reassignment, supra note 48, at 19721. 
66.  Id. 
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that, as the Court recognized, turns on the substance of the relationship that 
any given group of workers has with the particular state in question.67 In 
other words, it remains to be determined whether unionized home care 
workers in other states who receive Medicaid payments for their services 
are state employees.68  
Because the money spent on labor dues comes from money earned by 
the workers, the workers should be able to decide if they want some portion 
of it deducted and automatically allocated to union dues.  CMS goes so far 
as to claim that the rule change will “put[] [the workers] back in control” of 
the reimbursements they receive for providing care.69  Nothing could be 
further from the truth, as the change leads to the exact opposite outcome.  
As one home care worker asked, “Why is it OK for police officers, 
firefighters and teachers to pay union dues through paycheck deductions, 
but not us?”70  In establishing such a double standard, CMS has tapped into 
the vulnerability of state-paid home care workers, and exploited the harsh 
reality that employment policies repeatedly marginalize these workers and 
subject them to inferior treatment.    
States and organized labor, however, are pushing back and challenging 
this latest assault on home care workers.  The attorneys general of five 
states (California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington) 
have filed a lawsuit against the Trump administration contending that the 
new rule “frustrates the States’ public health interests by attempting to 
disrupt the collective-bargaining process that the States have established 
with respect to independent Medicaid homecare providers.”71 The states 
raise several causes of action, all based on the proposition that the new rule 
violates section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act.72  First, they 
contend that the type of third-party payments prohibited by the Medicaid 
 
67.  Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 641 n.10 (“What is significant is not the label that the State assigns 
to the personal assistants but the substance of their relationship to the customers and the State.”). 
68.  California v. Azar Complaint-In-Intervention at 19-20. 
69.  Medicaid Program Reassignment, supra note 48, at 19720. 
70.  Kay Wright, A New Rule Would Bar Home Care Workers from Deducting Union Dues from 
Paychecks. It’s Unfair, HARTFORD COURANT (June 7, 2019), https://www.courant.com/opinion/op-
ed/hc-op-wright-seiu-payroll-deductions-0607-20190607-yknjvmn5avaozpgbb47altxk3u-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/UY6P-HSKT]. 
71.  Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6, California v. Azar, Case No. 3:19-
cv-02552-VC (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2019), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press-docs/ca-v-
azar-complaint-medicaid-provider-payments.pdf [https://perma.cc/8289-5HME]. 
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provisions of the Social Security Act do not include voluntary and routine 
deductions for union dues.73 Plaintiffs also allege that CMS acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously, and abused its discretion by promulgating the new rule.  
In support of this allegation, plaintiffs assert that CMS adopted the new rule 
by relying on factors, such as anti-union sentiment, that do not implicate 
Congressional concerns with fraud and abuse.74   
Since the suit’s initial filing, a group of home care workers, along with 
the unions that represent them, have filed a successful motion to 
intervene.75   The intervenor plaintiffs have raised several additional 
noteworthy claims including the argument that the rule violates their First 
Amendment rights “to associate with each other and their union.”76 To 
support this claim, plaintiffs argue that by prohibiting the deductions, CMS 
has targeted union members’ ability to speak.  In Harris and Janus, the 
Court held a state violates the First Amendment when it requires an 
employee to pay agency fees to a union, because such a requirement 
compels the employee to subsidize speech with which she disagrees.  
Plaintiffs’ argument here is that by refusing to allow the deductions, CMS 
is preventing the workers from using their money to support the expression 
of speech with which they do agree.77  
 
III. MOVING FORWARD: PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS 
 
The assault on home care workers highlights the need to rethink current 
approaches to transforming home care into a decent job, one capable of 
attracting and retaining workers.  As noted earlier, organized labor has 
made considerable gains in helping with this transformation process. Yet 
even before Harris and Janus, labor was never positioned to reach the many 
workers who live in states hostile to unions.  
 
73.  Amended Compliant, supra note 71 at 8-9.  
74.  Id.; see also Benjamin Sachs, Hypocrisy on Agency Fees: Why the CMS Home Care Rule is 
Arbitrary and Capricious, ON LAB. (July 13, 2018), https://onlabor.org/hypocrisy-on-agency-fees-why-
the-cms-home-care-rule-is-arbitrary-and-capricious/ [https://perma.cc/EV3J-ACDQ]. 
75.  California v. Azar, No. 3:19-cv-02552-VC (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2019) (order regarding motions to 
intervene). 
76.  California v. Azar Complaint-In-Intervention. 
77.  Sachs, supra note 74 (advancing this argument to conclude that the final rule is capricious and 
arbitrary). 
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The labor movement will continue to strategize new approaches to 
sustain existing improvements made on behalf of unionized home care 
workers and consumers.   That said, it is imperative, now more than ever, 
to double down on efforts to extend basic labor and employment 
protections to home care workers.  The National Domestic Workers 
Alliance (NDWA) has led the charge to make this goal a reality.  Founded 
in 2007, the NDWA works to “build[] a floor of basic legal protections for 
domestic workers—a place from which workers and organizers can begin 
to advocate.”78  In 2010, NDWA’s campaign on this front resulted in New 
York becoming the first state in the nation to pass a domestic workers bill 
of rights.  That first bill of rights gave domestic workers overtime pay, one 
day off per week, three paid vacation days per year, and protection under 
New York’s Human Rights Law.79 
Since then, eight additional states, as well as two municipalities, have 
passed bills of rights for domestic workers.80 In 2018, a national Domestic 
Workers Bill of Rights was introduced in Congress.  The proposed 
legislation would extend protection to domestic workers under a range of 
existing federal employment laws including those related to discrimination 
and harassment, safety and health, and overtime.  It would also establish 
affordable healthcare and retirement benefits and provide grants for 
workforce training.81  
Although home care workers who provide publicly subsidized care are 
domestic workers, the aforementioned state and local legislation has not 
 
78.  Lauren Hilgers, Out of the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/02/21/magazine/national-domestic-workers-alliance.html 
[https://perma.cc/K3YN-2XYL]. 
79.  A1470B/S2311E, 2010 Gen. Assemb., 2010 Sess. (N.Y. 2010). 
80.  Madeline Joung, Domestic Workers Aren’t Protected by Anti-Discrimination Law. This New Bill 
Would Change That, TIME (July 15, 2019), https://time.com/5626156/domestic-workers-anti-
discrimination-law-ndwa/ [https://perma.cc/VF84-G7JX] (noting that in addition to New York, similar 
legislation has been enacted in California, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Illinois, Nevada, Oregon, 
Hawaii, New Mexico, and the city of Seattle).  A domestic workers bill of rights has also been introduced 
in Philadelphia, where it has been approved by the Philadelphia City Council. See Ayana Jones, City 
Council Passes Bill to Extend Labor Protections for Domestic Workers, PHILA. TRIB. (Oct. 31, 2019), 
https://www.phillytrib.com/news/local_news/city-council-passes-bill-to-extend-labor-protections-for-
domestic/article_8c00be62-5d64-5f93-98b9-9bd2f698a392.html [https://perma.cc/AD66-KC27]. 
81.  Domestic Workers Bill of Rights Act, S. 2112, 116th Cong. (2019–2020); Domestic Workers Bill 
of Rights Act, H.R. 3760, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Ai-jen Poo, They Look After Your Children. 
They Deserve Basic Rights, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/14/opinion/harris-jayapal-domestic-workers.html 
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consistently included them and at times has expressly excluded them.  
Consider, for example, Connecticut’s bill of rights which excludes home 
care workers “providing services under a state-funded program.”82 Similar 
restrictions exist in other versions of the bill-of-rights legislation.83  
Such exclusions are not surprising given that the bill of rights, similar 
to most other labor and employment legislation, hinges on a worker’s status 
as an “employee” as opposed to a self-employed independent contractor.84 
Although a home care worker operating under a consumer-directed care 
program is the employee of the care recipient, it is less clear if the worker 
is also an employee of the state.   As the opposing viewpoints in the Harris 
majority and dissenting opinions highlight, this issue is often fraught.  That 
said, even if the state does not employ the worker, an employment 
relationship exists between the worker and the consumer.  Yet home care 
advocates are understandably opposed to using this relationship as the basis 
for providing workers with essential workplace protections such as 
increased compensation, retirement benefits, or healthcare.  It would be 
unseemly to expect that consumers receiving publicly-funded home care 
services should shoulder the cost of providing their care workers with 
protections such as decent pay and economic benefits like health insurance 
and retirement plans.  As I have noted elsewhere, “[a]s between . . . 
consumers and government-sponsored home care programs, the latter can 
 
82.  S.B. 393 (2016), 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2016 Sess. (Conn.), 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/ba/2016SB-00393-R000331-BA.htm [https://perma.cc/CGX4-6N5H]. 
83.  The California legislation and the Seattle ordinance have similar provisions that expressly exclude 
publicly-funded home care workers.  See Office of the City Clerk, CB 11926, City of Seattle (July 27, 
2018), http://seattle.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3532201&GUID=232AE887-44C6-4450-
A040-84225AD4F11D [https://perma.cc/BTE6-CRGZ] (excluding a “home care worker who is paid 
through public funds”); The Domestic Worker Bill of Rights, CAL. DEP’T INDUS. REL., 
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/DomesticWorkerBillOfRights-FAQ.html [https://perma.cc/BJ2P-6R9Y] 
(excluding employees consist of “clients overseeing or receiving services under the In-Home Supportive 
Services (IHSS) program”).  Philadelphia’s proposed bill of rights contains a similar express exception. 
See Matthew Santoni, Domestic Worker Bill of Rights Advances in Philadelphia, LAW360 (Oct. 31, 
2019), https://www.law360.com/health/articles/1215726/domestic-worker-bill-of-rights-advances-in-
philadelphia [https://perma.cc/2NNU-KMU9] (noting that the bill excludes “home health care workers 
paid through public funds such as Medicare or Medicaid”). 
84.  Marc Linder, What Is an Employee? Why It Does, But Should Not, Matter, 7 L. & INEQ. 155, 157-
58 (1989) (listing various “benefits and protections conditioned on the existence of an employment 
relationship”).  
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best ensure that home care workers receive basic workplace protections as 
well as access to benefits such as health insurance.”85  
The proposed federal Domestic Workers Bill of Rights seems to share 
this perspective and appropriately places responsibility on the government.  
First, the bill expressly includes home care workers who provide consumer-
directed care funded by Medicaid in the definition of a “domestic worker.”  
Second, section 307 of the bill, entitled “Application to Domestic Workers 
who Provide Medicaid-Funded Services,”86 directs the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services (SHHS) to develop and issue regulations on how to 
apply the bill’s protections to workers providing consumer-directed care 
funded by Medicaid.  On this latter point, the bill prohibits states from 
requiring care recipients to use their own care-related public funds “to pay 
for costs resulting from the application of . . . protections and rights to 
domestic workers (such as paid sick time, penalties, or overtime pay) . . .”87 
The bill also instructs SHHS to develop mechanisms that states can use to 
pay for the costs of providing protections to these workers.88 
The bill is ambitious, but developing a comprehensive approach that 
will protect home care workers and increase access to affordable care for 
consumers requires a sustained public commitment and investment.  If 
enacted, the bill would also bring the United States in line with the 
International Labor Organization’s Convention on Decent Work for 
Domestic Workers.   Adopted in 2011, the labor standards outlined in the 
Convention underscore the importance of according domestic workers 
substantive labor rights that match those enjoyed by workers covered under 
basic labor and employment law protections.89  
Although the bill represents a necessary step to provide a measure of 
economic security to domestic workers, its chances of success do not seem 
promising in this politically divisive climate, especially as the bill currently 
 
85.  Peggie R. Smith, Home Sweet Home? Workplace Casualties of Consumer-Directed Home Care 
for the Elderly, 21 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 537, 555 (2007) [hereinafter, Smith, Home 
Sweet Home?]. 
86.  See S. 2112; H.R. 3760. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. 
89.  See Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers, opened for signature June 16, 
2011, 2955 U.N.T.S. 407. See generally Smith, Decent Work, supra note 40 (discussing the significance 
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lacks bipartisan support.90  That said, the bill’s message should not go 
unheeded by the many states struggling to provide their citizens with 
affordable quality home care including those states dealing with the 
challenges established by Harris, Janus, and the recent CMS ruling.   
Treating home care as a decent job requires at a minimum that workers be 
accorded basic employment protections wherever possible, comparable to 
those enjoyed by many other workers, and that opportunities be available 
to improve the quality of their work.   
To help achieve this objective, states should appoint review boards to 
engage in a searching examination of their existing employment laws, to 
identify those laws that exclude domestic workers, including home care 
workers providing consumer-directed care, and to consider the reasons for 
these exclusions.  The practice of excluding domestic work from labor and 
protection legislation, which dates back to at least the Progressive Era,91 is 
so ubiquitous that many legislative bodies likely continue this pattern 
without serious consideration of its harmful consequences.  State review 
boards should thus ask whether any particular exclusion represents 
longstanding and outdated assumptions about domestic work, including, 
for example, that such work is less valuable than other forms of labor or 
that it is less deserving of protection because it employs predominantly 
women of color, many of whom are immigrants.   
To be sure, domestic work has a relatively unique structure as 
compared with most other types of work because of its location within the 
private sphere of individual homes and the one-on-one characteristic of the 
relationship between the worker and employing household.  Yet, for too 
long, legislatures have embraced a default position that uses these and other 
differences, real or perceived, to exclude these workers from employment 
protections.  That default must be reversed in favor of inclusion.  Where 
substantive differences exist that might make it difficult to apply existing 
protections to domestic work, legislatures should look to tailor the 
provision of those laws in a manner that recognizes the specificity of the 
work.   
 
90.  The bill, which was introduced by Senator Kamala Harris (Democrat of California) and 
Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal (Democrat of Washington), has eight co-sponsors, all of whom are 
Democrats.  
91.  See Peggie R. Smith, Regulating Paid Household Work: Class, Gender, Race, and Agendas of 
Reform, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 851 (1999) (discussing the exclusion of domestic work from legislation 
enacted during the progressive era). 
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Of course, when it comes to consumer-directed home care services, 
another key distinction sets the work apart from most other employment 
relationships; namely, care recipients, as employers, generally lack the 
capacity to take on various employment obligations critical to transforming 
the work into a decent job.   However, to the extent that states operating 
these programs are not joint employers of the workers, they have made a 
choice to structure their home care programs so as to avoid treating the 
workers as rights-bearing public employees.92  The choice in part reflects 
the goal of respecting the interests of care recipients as consumers.  
Consumer-directed care embraces the philosophy that “individuals with 
long-term care needs should be empowered to make decisions about the 
services and supports they receive, including having primary control over 
the nature of the services, and who, when, and how the services are 
delivered . . .”93   
Yet, states eschew far more workplace responsibilities to their publicly-
funded, home care workers than they need to for the purpose of adhering to 
the tenets of consumer-directed care.  Consider Illinois, for example, 
which, as the Harris Court observed, “withholds from [publicly-funded 
home care workers] most of the rights and benefits enjoyed by full-fledged 
state employees.”94  Illinois excludes these workers from an astonishing 
array of workplace rights and protections including statutory retirement and 
health insurance benefits; group life insurance; paid vacation, holiday, and 
sick leave; the State Employee Vacation Time Act; the State Employee 
Health Savings Account Law; the State Employee Job Sharing Act; the 
State Employee Indemnification Act; the Sick Leave Bank Act; and the 
Illinois Whistleblower Act.95  Illinois also prohibits its publicly-funded 
home care workers from participating in a range of state programs 
including a deferred compensation program; full worker’s compensation 
privileges; behavioral health programs; a program that allows state 
employees to retain health insurance for a time after leaving state 
 
92.  See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
93.  James R. Knickman & Robyn I. Stone, The Public/Private Partnership Behind the Cash and 
Counseling Demonstration and Evaluation: Its Origins, Challenges, and Unresolved Issues, 42 HEALTH 
SERV. RES. 362, 364 (2007). 
94. Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 641 (2014). 
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employment; a commuter savings program; dental and vision programs; 
and a flexible spending program.96  
Illinois could readily extend many of the listed benefits to its state-paid 
home care workers without jeopardizing consumer control and indeed 
could do so even if the workers are not actual employees of the state.   The 
state could, for example, allow these workers to participate in the dental 
and vision programs, the commuter savings program, and the program that 
offers paid vacation, holiday, and sick leave without the workers needing 
to be state employees. I strongly suspect that Illinois’ decision not to do so 
had little if anything to do with respecting consumers’ control and 
everything to do with a strategy to contain the hefty costs associated with 
the provision of long-term care.  As a report prepared for the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services observes, “[b]y carefully 
structuring and documenting the consumer-worker employment 
relationship . . . states [can] minimize[ ] the likelihood of a credible claim 
that the state, rather than the consumer, is the worker’s employer.”97  A 
state that follows this guidance can eliminate the responsibilities and costs 
associated with having an employment relationship with its publicly-
funded home care workers. 
It was against this backdrop of exclusion and cost containment that 
unions came to represent such a powerful voice on behalf of state-paid 
home care workers. Unions pushed states like Illinois to do better for both 
workers and consumers and, in the process, managed to secure for workers 
some of the protections and benefits that they had been denied. However, 
organized labor accomplished only so much, and it never dismantled 
Illinois’ two-tier workplace system that separated personal care assistants 
from other state workers for the purpose of workplace benefits and 
protections.  Ironically, the state’s maintenance of such a system became 
part of the justification for the Court in Harris to hold that Illinois could 
not compel non-union workers to pay agency fees even as Janus ultimately 
would have produced the same result. 
Hopefully, states are beginning to appreciate that a refusal to accept 
more than passing employment responsibility for home care workers 
 
96.  Id. at 640-41. 
97.  See Smith, Home Sweet Home, supra note 85, at 537 (discussing the desire of states to craft 
consumer-directed home care programs in order to avoid liability to workers under labor and 
employment laws). 
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providing consumer-directed care was never a cost-free proposition.  While 
such a refusal may theoretically allow a state to decrease the direct costs of 
home care, workers pay a hefty price in poor working conditions and 
consumers pay a price in substandard care. Absent the ameliorating effects 
of organized labor, the price presumably would be even higher.   Moving 
forward, if states are serious about fortifying and extending the successes 
made by organized labor, they will look to afford state-paid home care 
workers increased rights associated with the status of being full-fledged, 
state employees while still allowing consumers autonomy to direct their 
own care.  
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